LANGUAGE
English
SOURCE
IEEE ICC
Published Date:2015-6
ABSTRACT
In cellular networks, the coverage of base stations
(BSs) belonging to different operators often overlaps. As a result,
when the traffic load is lower than the peak volume, there are
opportunities to turn off a subset of BSs to save power, potentially
from different operators, leaving their users to be served by other
BSs. Because in this case the active BSs can be shared among
different operators, it is rational to assume that operators are
self-interested and hold their own private information, such as
their own traffic loads. In this paper, we consider the problem of
how to motivate operators to cooperate and reveal their private
information such that the overall utility can be maximized, which
is also called social efficiency in mechanism design. A new BS
utility model that depends on the BS’s energy consumption is
proposed. Based on this, a game theoretic mechanism with money
transfer between operators is designed, which has been proved to
be incentive compatible and budget-balanced. Simulation results
under various traffic load distributions show that when the
operators have similar traffic load distributions, they would like
to participate the cooperation voluntarily.
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